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Our philosopher, economist, political scientist, computer scientist and logician
convene yet again after enjoying one of Paul’s lunches. Outside it is showering
with heavy rain. Autumn finally seems to have arrived.
Philosopher: It has taken me a while but I think I now see what social software
is trying to get at. Its ultimate driving force seems to be a desire to help solve
social problems. For this, one should of course understand these problems
and get a good grasp of their structure. So, and that’s the second element,
we focus on the analysis of such social problems. Finally, the way of going
about in both the analysis and the formulation of the possible solutions is to
make use of formal techniques that originate from a variety of disciplines—
economics, logic, computer science. And this is what gives the enterprise its
cross-disciplinary flavor.
Logician: That sounds about right. We agreed in an earlier discussion that
it may not be expedient to try and give a precise definition of social software
(see page ??).
Political Scientist: (To the philosopher) But I get the impression that you
have reservations about the whole enterprise. In fact, you have been somewhat
grumpy all along.
Philosopher: I’m sorry to hear that I came across as grumpy. I must confess
I have a worry about the almost exclusive focus on the three elements of so-
lution, analysis, and methodology. We do indeed talk at length about specific
problems, solutions to those problems and all sorts of techniques that could
be used. But we have not really addressed the question what it is that con-
stitutes a problem nor about when a specific proposal can count as a solution
and when it cannot.
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Logician: We can’t have it all at once, can we? In fact, isn’t it better to go
about in a kind of piecemeal way rather than posing all those big questions
at once?
Economist: I am not even sure that I understand what it is that we are
supposed to have neglected.
Philosopher: Ok, I’ll try to explain but let me say at the outset that I do not
try to argue for the return to a “grand” analysis of big philosophical questions.
I am very much convinced of the necessity of breaking up big problems, and
I agree that formal methods are an excellent tool for that. What I want to
point out is that we should be more sensitive to the normative assumptions
underlying our detailed analysis in order to improve upon that analysis. To
illustrate, consider the various alternative solutions to the Solomon verdict
that we discussed earlier. Those solutions were based upon the idea that the
professed mothers make a bid for the child. Game-theoretical analysis shows
that under such schemes we can make sure that the only equilibrium outcome
is the one in which the real mother gets the child, at no cost at all.
Economist: Yes, what could possibly be wrong with that?
Philosopher: I wish to maintain that cheerfully proposing algorithms to solve
social problems without worrying about moral side constraints is a question-
able way to proceed. Has anyone considered the possibility that it may be
immoral to ask a mother to assign a value to her child’s life?
Logician: Why is that? Note that the auction solution simply exploits the
fact that the true mother will hold the child dearer than her own life. The
solution works precisely because a child is priceless to the real mother and
not to the fake mother.
Computer Scientist: I see the point about moral side constraints if we consider
algorithms like “Apply physical or psychological coercion until the suspected
terrorist has named all his contacts”. I agree there might be something wrong
with that one.
Logician: Yes, and the rule of law in civilized countries is meant to prevent
such criminal methods.
Economist: According to an article in the New Yorker that I have read [14],
a CIA program to outsource torture by means of “extraordinary rendition”
of suspected terrorists to countries like Syria or Egypt existed already in the
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1990s. Mind you, these are countries where they would almost certainly be
tortured. And it got completely out of hand after 9/11.
Philosopher: To get back at something closer to the Solomon verdict, consider
the gruesome scenario of Sophie’s Choice, William Styron’s famous novel [21]
about a choice a mother is forced to make by a sadistic Nazi officer. She is
made to choose which of her two children stays alive, and which gets killed.
If she refuses to choose, the Nazis will kill both children. It has been argued
that part of the gruesomeness of this choice has to do with Sophie’s identity
as a mother. According to the philosopher Joseph Raz [18], the mother is
asked by the Nazis to do something that violates the essence of what it means
to be a parent: not to choose between one’s children. The parallel with the
Solomon verdict is that we there ask a mother to state how much she values
her own child. But, if Raz is right, that is something that she cannot do
without violating her own identity as a parent. Hence, what looks like a neat
solution turns out to be based on a gross violation of one of our central values.
Computer Scientist: I don’t see what you are getting at with this example.
Surely, imposing such a choice on a mother is immoral. We all agree.
Economist: Imagine yourself in the position of Sophie. Being put in such a
situation is gruesome and immoral. But it does not make things better if she
refuses to make a choice, or does it? That way, she condemns both of her
children. Suppose she would ask her children: what should I do, nothing, in
which case both of you will be killed, or flip a coin? What do you think they
would say?
Logician: Let’s not get carried away. This may all be beside the point. To
make a choice between one’s two children, and to express how much one values
one’s only child seem very different things to me.
Economist: Yes, and the artillery is a bit heavy, too. Maybe there is a way
to make your point without bringing in Nazi practices?
Philosopher: The point of the story was not that it is impossible to assign a
value to a human life. In fact, I not only believe that to be possible but am
convinced that we do so on a regular basis, for example when we decide what
kind of safety devices to buy for one’s car. What I said is that forcing parents
to assign a value to the lives of their children violates their identity as parents
and may therefore be immoral.
Logician: Put yourself in the place of Solomon, then. You are holding court,
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and two raging women are brought into your courtroom. A soldier carries in
a crying baby. The women both claim that they are the mother of the child.
You have the legal authority to enforce a decision. You also have a reputation
of wisdom to lose. What do you do?
Philosopher: I must confess I don’t know. I would have to reflect on this.
Computer Scientist: I would not object to be in the place of Solomon. All
those beautiful concubines . . .
Logician: Listen, everyone agrees that Solomon’s method is harsh. But if you
object to that, you have to come up with something better. Flipping a coin
would have avoided putting pressure on the women in a way that you deem
morally dubious. Trouble is that now there is a fifty percent chance that the
child gets handed over to the impostor.
Philosopher: Fair enough. Well, let me think. I guess I would try to find a
way that ensures the child goes to the real mother but which does not suffer
from unwanted and avoidable side-effects. So can we design a procedure that
also has the desired outcome but in which we need not ask the mother to
assign a value to her child’s life? Suppose that Solomon asks each of the
women to write down whether they still want to claim the child. He tells
them beforehand that if exactly one of the two makes such a claim, the child
will go to her. If however they both claim the child (or if neither of them
does) the child will be raised in the palace and each woman should pay a fine
that is equivalent to say her annual income. Given her love for the child, the
real mother will claim the child: she prefers any situation in which she has
tried to get her child back. Realizing this, the other pulls out. After all, given
the real mother’s claim, there is no chance that she will get the child and she
will therefore want to make sure that she does not have to pay the fine. So we
have the desired outcome without having asked the mother to assign a value
to her child.
Economist: That’s neat. But aren’t you making an implicit extra assumption
about the motives of the fake mother? That is, if her wish to have the child is
primarily based on a desire to frustrate the real mother then she may prefer
paying the fine after all.
Philosopher: Yes, you are right. But note that such an assumption is also
made in the solution that I protested against.
Logician: And can we be sure that the real mother prefers the situation in
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which the child is at the palace to the one in which the child is with the fake
mother but in which she is not fined?
Philosopher: Yes, I do make that assumption. For which parent would not
prefer a situation in which she has done everything she can to keep her own
child? Wouldn’t you prefer to pay a fine to having to live with the thought that
you did not claim your own child, a child who now is raised by an impostor
mother? The only reason why one could prefer the latter is, I think, if one
fears that the child will have a very nasty life at the palace, say because he
will become a slave there. But Solomon can preclude such a complication by
ensuring the women that the child will have a decent upbringing in the palace.
Economist: Your proposal brings to mind the famous disagreement between
deontology and consequentialism in ethics. Deontologists stress duty or deon,
consequentialists look at whether the outcome is fair or desirable. Maybe
designers of social mechanisms are more often consequentialists than deonto-
logists . . .
Philosopher: In this case the solution is based on the woman having what is
called a procedural preference: she prefers to have done everything she could
to obtain the child irrespective of the consequences [11].
Economist: The solution hinges on the assumption that the women try to
realize their preferences — procedural or not — as well as possible. But I
don’t see why it discredits the view that consequentialists do a better job in
finding solutions to practical social problems.
Philosopher: Deontologists and consequentialists often disagree about what
the problems are so you can’t say in general that one approach works better
than the other. In the Solomon case my worry was about an aspect of the
solution that was proposed, not about the nature of the problem itself. And
in some cases in which there is agreement about what the problem is I would
rather not leave the solution of those problems in the hands of people who
think that the ends justify the means.
Logician: Some time ago I came across an interesting book by James Wood
Bailey, where the view is defended that utilitarianism, which I suppose is
a form of consequentialism, is a useful basis for political theory [5]. Bailey
does not deny that individuals within institutions have moral responsibilities
that cannot be defined in terms of utility alone. But utility can be used as
a yardstick for valuing institutions. It allows us to identify morally valuable
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institutions. The argument is based on a definition of institutions as equilibria
in complex or iterative games.
Computer Scientist: Wait, let me guess. I see how his argument would go.
I bet he just redefines my duty to abstain from stealing, say, in terms of
maximizing my long-term interest. Why is stealing a bicycle morally wrong?
Because it is not in my long term interest. I will get caught, or if not, my
own bike will get stolen tomorrow, or I will have to invest in an expensive
lock to get my bike from getting stolen, and so on. This is just an iterative
version of the prisoner’s dilemma game, where ‘cooperate unless challenged’
is the most successful strategy. So it turns out that what is morally right is
what is good for me in the long run. See Axelrod’s book on the evolution of
collaboration [4], or Maynard Smith on evolution and the theory of games [15]
that we discussed before (page ??).
Logician: In Amsterdam the only reasonable thing to do is to ride on a cheap
bicycle and invest in two expensive bike locks. Any bike thief will prefer to
steal a more expensive bicycle locked with a single lock. But this is prudence,
not morality. You are right, by the way, about Bailey’s argument.
Philosopher: I am not sure a reduction of norms and values to our long-term
interests is needed for the design of social algorithms. Consider the problem
of fair division. There may be all sorts of different considerations that affect
whether a division of a legacy is fair or not. In some cases it may be fair to
give each of the children an equal share. In other cases we may want to give
one of the children a bigger share, say because the others have squandered
a large part of the family fortune. If we take the long term perspective, we
should describe the problem as forming a small part of a much larger ‘game of
life’ [6] which explains — in terms of our interests — the relevant moral side
constraints in the division problem at hand. It would of course be great if
this were possible, but I don’t see why we should embark on it for a particular
division problem. It seems to me that it suffices to be aware of the fact that
different moral considerations may affect what is a problem and what is not,
and what is an appropriate solution to a problem. We should thus be sensitive
to those considerations both in the formulation of our problems and in the
analysis of our solutions to them.
Political Scientist: Ah, that’s what you are getting at! Of course, the solutions
that we have discussed are based on the assumption that they all have a right
to an equal share.
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Philosopher: So you’re saying that the solution only works for certain prob-
lems of fair division?
Logician: Of course, if there is debate about whether fair division is the correct
procedure to be applied to a certain case, then that debate should be settled
first.
Computer Scientist: This seems like an orthogonal issue to me. Scientists
have learnt to disentangle such issues. But you philosophers seem to enjoy an
occasional bit of conceptual confusion.
Economist: We should bear in mind that a model by definition leaves things
out. Models are meant to get us started with thinking about solutions to
well-defined versions of problems, without immediately taking aboard messy
notions like moral rights and obligations. This still seems to me the most
expedient route. And now I need a cigarette, if you’ll excuse me.
(The economist goes outside to have a smoke. The others get a cup of cof-
fee. After a few minutes, the economist returns, a bit wet. It is still raining
outside.)
Philosopher: I really don’t understand why you don’t get it. What is so con-
troversial about my point? Clearly, if we are interested in providing solutions
to social problems then we cannot ignore normative considerations. To say
that something is a problem is to take a normative stance. The same applies
to the formulation of a solution to a problem. Whether something is a solution
or not is not a purely value-neutral issue.
Logician: Yes, you sort of said this before. Maybe it helps if you give a
concrete example of what you have in mind.
Philosopher: Take an example from economics, then. The economist and
philosopher Amartya Sen [20; 16] argued that notions like rights, freedom
and equality are of utmost importance for our understanding of human well-
being. For him, the importance of these considerations was not a reason to
abandon the economic framework, but rather to broaden the framework so as
to make room for these new concepts.
Economist: This has had profound consequences for our thinking about poverty.
For a long time, economists were accustomed to define poverty in terms of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) —the lower the GDP per capita, the poorer
the country was said to be. As a result, policies aimed at reducing poverty
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primarily were primarily aimed at increasing GDP per capita.
Philosopher: I suppose you need some indicator to measure success of an
economic policy.
Economist: That’s right, but Sen argued that GDP was a poor indicator for
poverty. First of all, the focus on aggregate country data means that we
lose sight of certain very relevant differences in well-being. Afro-American
men in the U.S., for instance, have a lower life expectancy than males in
China, yet the GDP of the U.S. is much higher. Moreover, the focus on
GDP entails that we overlook certain crucial differences between countries.
Take the example of large scale famines, which, as Sen points out, have never
happened in democracies. Sen argues that this is not a coincidence: famines
can only happen in authoritarian systems lacking openness of information and
transparency of procedures. Sen’s advocacy of capabilities or entitlements led
to a change of policy of the UN: instead of reporting on economic development
only, they now report on a wide range of issues under ‘economic and social
development’. 1
Political Scientist: Sen was right: the formulation of the problem of the ex-
istence of poverty is of utmost importance. Sen’s own proposals for how to
view the problem of poverty can of course also be questioned. Some of those
who shared Sen’s criticism of GDP as an indicator for poverty have disagreed
with his alternative to it. But how does this translate to the social software
enterprise? We are not yet focusing on world-scale problems like poverty. Can
we be sure we need reflection on our normative assumptions?
Logician: Consider the issue of strategic behavior, the topic of the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem. The theorem states that almost every social choice
function is vulnerable to manipulation, that is, that it may be advantageous
for one or more of the individuals not to submit their real preferences. Or,
as it also has been formulated, individuals may have an incentive to lie about
their preferences.
Economist: Within economic theory, that theorem gave rise to a specialized
subfield: implementation theory. The idea there is to find mechanisms that
‘implement’ manipulable social choice functions. A mechanism is said to
implement a social choice function if, when the mechanism is used rather than
the social choice function, the strategic behavior of the individuals will result
1See http://www.un.org/esa/.
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in the same outcome as what would have resulted if they had all expressed
their real preferences under the social choice function.
Political Scientist: This sounds like a nice example of social software. A
problem is formulated—the manipulability of social choice functions—and
an algorithm is formulated—the implementation mechanism—to solve the
problem.
Philosopher: Yes, indeed. But still I think we should examine the normative
assumptions underlying the approach. Why is strategic behavior considered
to be a problem? In a recent paper [12] Dowding and Van Hees argue that
in a context of political decision making strategic behavior may be a virtue
rather than a vice. They argue that if a procedure is manipulable, that is,
if strategic behavior may pay off, then rational individuals have to make a
calculation about what is best for them to do. This means that they will try to
collect information about the beliefs and preferences of the other individuals,
about the way in which the social choice function operates, about the possible
ways the others may act, and so on. In sum, the greater the incentives to
manipulate, the greater the incentive to obtain information about the decision
problem. If having more information about the process is considered to be
a valuable thing, and many theorists of democracy have indeed argued so,
then it is a good thing that the social choice function is manipulable. There
need not be a problem for an implementation theorist or a social software
designer to solve. In fact, the use of a mechanism that makes manipulation
impossible may in fact be creating a problem rather than that it solves one:
it impoverishes the political process.
Political Scientist: When it was pointed out to Jean-Charles de Borda that his
election scheme—where voters distribute points over candidates to indicate
an order of preference—is highly susceptible to strategic manipulation, he is
said to have exclaimed: ‘My scheme is intended only for honest men’ [7, p.
182].
Logician: Well, that severely limits its usefulness.
Economist: Surely manipulation may pose problems, even in a political con-
text. Think of the cost of getting all this extra information. Also, it makes
the decision process more unpredictable.
Political Scientist: And will it not be unfair for those individuals who do not
have the same strategic skills as others?
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Economist: That disadvantage would also apply to the implementation mecha-
nisms.
Philosopher: The argument does not yield that manipulability is always a
good thing; it merely challenges the view that it is never a good thing.
Again, my point is that we should be careful about what we believe to be
a problem that needs solving. Take the decision making process at univer-
sity department meetings. Say we want to “solve” the problem of inefficiency
or non-transparency of such meetings, a problem that we are probably all
familiar with. It may well be the case that getting rid of inefficiency or non-
transparency creates new problems that are more serious than the ones we
intended to solve.
Logician: Abolishing departmental meetings altogether also has its draw-
backs, you mean?
Computer Scientist: I agree that we should always think carefully about the
severity of a disease before administering potent cures. Good doctors try to
avoid iatrogenic illness, problems arising from the treatment itself. But how
does one do that? Does philosophy have a patent cure-all? Should we assume
that meetings at philosophy departments are conducted in more constructive
and efficient ways than elsewhere?
Philosopher: Well, at least we have learnt from long experience that we agree
more easily on pragmatic solutions than on fundamental principles.
Logician: Ahem—hardly what I would call a systematic method.
Philosopher: The interesting thing is that when there are strong disagreements
about fundamental principles, a solution can only be pragmatic if it does not
go against any of those principles. In order to be pragmatic, one should
know what it means not to be pragmatic. And here insights from ethics are
often of use. There are all sorts of ways of going about. For instance, one
can distinguish between consequentialist and non-consequentialist accounts of
what a problem is.
Computer Scientist: I attended the occasional lecture on ethics, but what
vexes me is the exclusive focus on moral problems, or should I say, moral
puzzles. The whole enterprise seems to miss a fundamental point about how
people behave. Ethicists, at least those I have listened to, seem to assume that
people when reflecting on a course of action analyze the morality of it, reach
a conclusion, and then act accordingly. But what we see is that humans have
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great trouble to do what is in their best interest, and even greater trouble to
do what their conscience tells them to do.
Philosopher: “Following one’s conscience” is just a metaphor, although one
that Church philosophers like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas took quite
seriously.
Computer Scientist: What I meant is making resolves, and then failing to
stick to them. Oblomov behaviour. See, people are not like computers at all.
A mouse-click on the “do A” button, but nothing happens.
Philosopher: That is what philosophers call ‘akrasia’, or inability to act in
accordance with one’s best judgement [17].
Logician: “O Lord, give me chastity, but not yet.” The only quote from
St. Augustine that I know by heart [3]. Very human, indeed.
Computer Scientist: When I teach programming skills, I have found out that
it is no use to explain to my students that master programmers write clear
code with documentation, insert tests that can serve as specifications, and
restructure their programs whenever needed. Instead, I just drill them and
give them feedback — letting them rewrite their unstructured rubbish until
it satisfies my standards — until writing clear code is second nature to them.
Not very different from instilling moral behavior in my young children. I
mean skills like not hurting other children, not being rude, being honest, being
polite. I have never heard ethicists address the issue of moral education, and
that is precisely why I find ethics as an academic discipline so utterly boring
and irrelevant.
Logician: Aristotle’s syllogistics may be just a footnote to modern logic, but
Aristotle’s Ethics [2] is more inspiring than many of today’s sterile discussions.
Philosopher: Thank you very much. I don’t accept this dismissal of armchair
philosophy though. If for instance thinking about the distinction between
facts and values is a form of armchair philosophy, then I am happy to be an
armchair philosopher. Moreover, you may want to catch up on the develop-
ments. The kind of armchair philosophy that you are criticizing hardly serves
as an accurate picture of contemporary ethics. Whether it concerns a new
field like neuro-ethics [13], developments in moral psychology [10], the study
of the evolution of norms [22], or the revival of virtue ethics, we can witness
an empirical turn in our thinking about moral issues. As to the revival of
virtue ethics, the plea that ethics should take psychological insights into ac-
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count can already be found in a landmark paper by Elizabeth Anscombe that
was published in 1958 [1].
Computer Scientist: Ahem, 1958 is a long time ago. Was this a plea for
a return to the Aristotelian view of ethics, with much greater emphasis on
psychology? And did academic philosophers pay any attention?
Philosopher: As a matter of fact, many of them did, and there are quite a
lot of places where you could start. A book I very much recommend is Moral
Goodness by Philippa Foot [9]. It revives the ancient idea of a link between
human happiness and virtue. It marks a fresh start in thinking about moral
issues, and is already a classic. Foot was one of the founders of Oxfam, by the
way. And it may interest you that Foot introduced the trolley problem that
Rohit Parikh mentioned in his lecture here at NIAS (see page ??). Another
gem is Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, by Bernard Williams [23]. I
am almost sure you will like it, for Williams is about as skeptical as you
are about what philosophy can have to say about moral issues. Only more
knowledgeable, of course.
Computer Scientist: (With a smile) Of course.
Logician: I don’t know about Foot or Williams, but Aristotle is a good prac-
tical psychologist, and that is why much of what he has to say about reaching
one’s full potential by training oneself to be an excellent man — or woman,
one has to add — is still relevant today. We may want to study ethics in order
to improve our lives, and the principal concern of the subject, according to
Aristotle, is the nature of human well-being.
Computer Scientist: I like the view that people must be trained to be moral.
It reminds me of the well known Zen simile of the training of the mind as
“taming the wild ox” [19]. And a friend in cognitive science told me that the
image of a wild animal and a rider with limited control squares quite well with
modern findings of how emotion and reason interact in determining action [8].
Logician: (At the economist) It explains why you have difficulty giving up
smoking. Your habit is endangering your health, and you know it. The
warning message printed on your fags reminds you. Your insurance company
makes you pay a premium for the extra risk. You can work out the statistics.
Still, you can’t give up, because the ox is stronger than the rider.
Computer Scientist: To smoke or not to smoke: that question may have
something to do with ethics after all. I am sure Aristotle would have agreed
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that an addicted smoker is lacking in the quality of temperance.
Philosopher: If ethicists are censored for their bad habits, there is always an
easy rejoinder: “Who has ever seen a signpost walk in the direction that it
points to?”
Political Scientist: Let’s leave a discussion of the virtues for another occasion.
I think we have talked enough for one lunch.
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